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EXPERIENCE AS A BASIS FOR REFORM
Roughly one-quarter of the workers in the United States are repre-
sented by unions, leaving three-quarters subject to the vicissitudes of the
employment-at-will doctrine.' At-will employees, as a general matter,
lack protection against dismissal without cause.2 That is, an employer
may dismiss an "at will" employee without notice, "for good reason, bad
reason or no reason at all," so long as the proffered reasons for dismissal
do not violate random whistle-blowing provisions or federal and state
anti-discrimination statutes.' The mirror image of the employer's right
to dismiss at will is the right of an employee who was hired to perform
work for an indefinite period of time to terminate the employment rela-
tionship for any reason at any time.4
By contrast, union employees enjoy the benefit of the collective bar-
gaining agreement which, in a written contract between the employer
ED. NOTE: The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Magali Valat, LL.M. candi-
date 1988 University of Pennsylvania Law School.
I. For a survey of statistics on the status of employees at will and the number of employees
annually terminated under the employment-at-will doctrine see Rodgers & Stieber, Employee Dis-
charge in the 20th Century: A Review of the Literature, 108 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 35 (1985); Stieber,
Most US. Workers Still May Be Fired Under the Employment-At-Will Doctrine, 107 MONTHLY LAB.
REV. 34 (1984); Stieber, Termination of Employment in the United States, 5 CoMP. LAB. L. 327
(1982); Stieber, The Case for Protection of Unorganized Employees Against Unjust Discharge, in IN-
DUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASS'N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-SECOND ANNUAL MEET-
ING 155, 160-61 (B. Dennis ed. 1980); Estreicher & Wolff, At-Will Employment and the Problem of
Unjust Dismissal in CURRENT TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN LABOR AND EMPLOYEE RELA-
TIONS LAW 195, 199 Practicing Law Institute (J. Waks ed. 1982) [hereinafter CURRENT TRENDS];
Keyes, Emerging Rights of Unrepresented Employees and Protections from Arbitrary Discharge, supra
in CURRENT TRENDS at 143, 148.
2. Common exceptions to the employment-at-will rule found throughout the United States
include civil servants, university and college professors. Interview with Janice Bellace, Associate
Professor of Legal Studies and Management, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, in
Philadelphia (Mar. 23, 1987).
3. Id. See Keyes, supra note 1, at 146-147 (survey of federal anti-discrimination legislation).
4. For a statement of the rule see Keyes, supra note 1, at 143. See Adair v. United States, 208
U.S. 161 (1908); see also California Labor Code § 2(d) 922; Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456
Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974) (held no right of action for wrongful discharge where complaint dis-
closes legitimate reason for termination); Ford v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 389 N.W.2d
114 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) ("exit interview" after employee dismissed did not create implied contract
employee would be dismissed for just cause).
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and the union, expressly creates mutual rights and obligations.' The col-
lective agreement lays down nearly all of the terms and conditions of
employment of the employees in the bargaining unit.6 One of the terms
present in nearly all collective agreements is a term limiting the em-
ployer's power of discharge to cases in which just cause exists.7 Non-
unionized employees, however, remain subject to the traditional doctrine
of at-will employment.'
State courts have recognized some exceptions to this doctrine in the
past two decades.' For the most part, however, these are narrow excep-
tions, based on public policy concerns.' ° Some observers have argued
that the continuing judicial erosion of the employment-at-will doctrine
will move closer the date of true statutory reform of dismissal law." The
purpose of this Comment is to explore the feasibility of modeling either a
federal or a uniform state statute governing dismissal law after statutes
that now exist in a few states.' 2 A look at other countries' statutory
5. Summers, The Rights of Individual Workers The Contract of Employment and the Rights of
Individual Employees: Fair Representation and Employment At Will, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 1082,
1085 (1984).
6. Id. at 1088.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See e.g. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d
880 (1980) (personnel manual which contained a "just cause" standard, gave rise to enforceable
contract rights); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (alleged discharge
for refusal to socialize with foreman; held, that an employer may not discharge if motivated by bad
faith, malice or retaliation).
10. See e.g., Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975) (discharge for performing the
public obligation of jury duty); Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d
876 (1981) (supplying information about fellow employee to police in criminal investigation).
11. See generally Estreicher, Emerging Rights of Unrepresented Employees and Protections from
Arbitrary Discharges in CURRENT TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN LABOR AND EMPLOYEE RELA-
TIONs LAW 155, Practicing Law Institute (J. Waks ed. 1982); Keyes, supra note I, at 146-153;
Bellace, A Right of Fair Dismissal: Enforcing a Statutory Guarantee, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 207
(1983); Decker At- Will Employment: Abolition and Federal Statutory Regulation, 61 U. DET. L.
REV. 351 (1984); Hill, Arbitration as a Means of Protecting Employees from Unjust Dismissal: A
Statutory Proposal, N. ILL. U.L. REV. 111 (1982); Jenkins, Federal Legislative Exceptions to the At-
Will Doctrine: Proposed Statutory Protection for Discharges Violative of Public Policy, 47 ALB. L.
REV. 466 (1983); Malin, Protecting the Whistleblower from Retaliatory Discharge, 16 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 277 (1983); Peck, Employment Problems of the Handicapped: Would Title VII Remedies be
Appropriate and Effective?, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 343 (1983); St. Antoine, You're Fired, 10 HUMAN
RIGHTS 32 (1982); Stieber & Murray, Protection Against Unjust Discharge: The Need for a Federal
Statute, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 319 (1983); Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal:
Time For A Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 431 [hereinafter Summers, Individual Protection]; Summers, The
Rights of Individual Workers, supra note 5; Note, Employment at Will: An Analysis and Critique of
the Judicial Role, 68 IOWA L. REV. 787 (1983); Note, Reforming At-Will Employment Law: A
Model Statute, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 389 (1983); Note, Ensuring Good Faith in Dismissals, 63 TEX.
L. REV. (1984); Note, The Employment-At- Will Doctrine: Providing a Public Policy Exception to
Improve Worker Safety, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 435 (1983); Note, Three New Exceptions to the Em-
ployment At Will Doctrine-Thompson v. SL Regis Paper Co., 102 Wn. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984),
60 WASH. L. REV. 209 (1984).
12. Recent state legislatures have considered but not passed bills in this area. In California, the
Assembly considered Assembly Bill 1165 in 1983, which was introduced by Member McAlister and
provided for relief if termination was found to be in breach of an implied contract and not based
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development may also be instructive. 3 France provides one such model.
Part One of this Comment focuses on the French approach to the
dismissal law. Part Two of the Comment examines France's restrictions
on the employer's right to dismiss through the development of the judi-
cial doctrine of abus de droit.I4 Part Two also analyzes the underlying
purposes of the early dismissal legislation in France and explores the
mechanics and judicial application of the French dismissal statute. Part
Three examines the historical development of the employment-at-will
doctrine in the United States and its judicial and legislative erosion. Part
Four suggests a way to incorporate both the French model and the ex-
isting International Labor Organization unfair dismissal standards into
our state statutory systems. The Comment concludes that adoption of
unfair dismissal legislation on a state-by-state basis in the United States is
not only timely and feasible but also desirable.
I. France
The French Revolution shaped the master-servant system of em-
ployment relations. I" The drafters of the Napoleonic Civil Code' 6 were
influenced by the principle of individual liberty.' As a result, the Civil
Code established and respected the preeminence of the will of individual
parties to enter freely into contracts for the "hiring of service."'" Since
upon fair and honest cause or reason. It also considered Assembly Bill 3017 in 1974, also introduced
by Member McAlister, which provided for mediation and arbitration procedures for wrongful dis-
charge claims. The California Senate considered two bills: Senate Bill 2317 in 1983, which was
introduced by Senator Royce and provided relief if termination was found to be in breach of an
implied contract and not based upon fair and honest cause yet was not applicable to executives and
Senate Bill 1348 in 1985, which was introduced by Senator Greene and was endorsed by the Califor-
nia Federation of Labor. In Michigan, the House considered House Resolution 5155 in 1983, which
prohibited unfair discharge and provided for mediation and final and binding arbitration. The New
York State Senate considered Senate Bill 8969 in 1984, which was introduced by Senator Pisani and
protected employees from unjust dismissal. Lastly, the Pennsylvania House considered House Bill
2105 in 1984, which protected employees from unjust dismissal and provided for mediation and
arbitration proceedings as well as legal remedies.
13. For an insightful discussion of the uses and misuses of comparative labor law see Whelan,
Labor Law Reform and Comparative Law, 65 TEx. L. REV. 1425 (1985).
14. For an explanation of the concept of abus de droit, see infra note 50, and accompanying
text.
15. For a general historical background on the development of workers' rights in France, see G.
CAMERLYNCK & G. LYON-CAEN, PRfCIS DE DRorr DU TRAVAIL, 6-25 (1973) [hereinafter DROIT
DU TRAVAIL]; Camerlynck, Contrat de Travail, in Dalloz Encyclopddie Juridique Repertoire de Droit
du Travail 1 (1976) [hereinafter Contrat de Travail]; F. MEYERS, OWNERSHIP OF Jos: A COMPAR-
ATIVE STUDY 44-72 (1964).
16. CODE CVIL [C. ciV.] art. 1134 (codifies the principle that "contracts legally entered into
have the authority of law with respect to the contracting parties").
17. Daorr DU TRAVAIL, supra note 15, at 150-51; Contrat de Travail, supra note 15, § 1.
18. The Civil Code treated all contracts with equal respect. Two specific kinds of contracts
were addressed by the Civil Code: the contract for purchase and sale of merchandise and the con-
tract for hiring of labor. In both instances, the principle of individual liberty and freedom of con-
tract applied. See G. LYON-CAEN, CODE CIVIL (1928) (specific language of Code reproduced with
annotation); see DROrr DU TRAVAIL, supra note 15, at 6-7; MEYERS, supra note 15, at 44-45.
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the government would not interfere with the relationships created be-
tween employer and employee via the contract for labor, employment
relationships were largely unregulated.' 9
The French National Assembly enacted a series of statutes which
acted to condemn guilds and medieval corporations as against public in-
terest. The National Assembly viewed guilds and corporations as unduly
restrictive of commerce and as vehicles for the reintroduction of involun-
tary servitude as the length of apprenticeship could be for many years or
even for life.20 In 1791, French workers were given the right to "exercise
any profession, craft or trade which they please[d]."'' As a result of the
decree, workers could now sell their labor to any employer under any
terms to which they could agree, with one exception. 22 Article 178023 of
the Civil Code limited the right of a worker to contract out his labor to a
specified employer for a specified amount of time.24 The underlying pur-
pose of this provision was to prevent the resurgence of associations
counter to the new liberal system by allowing individuals the freedom to
strike any bargain, on whatever terms they desired."
To the extent that the Napoleonic Code did regulate the formation
of employment contracts, it favored the employer. 26  Article 1781,27
which was repealed in 1868, provided that in disputes involving wages,
paid or due, the affirmation of the master alone automatically created an
irrebuttable presumption that wages were in fact paid.28  Nevertheless,
19. See supra note 18.
20. Lorwin, France, in COMPARATIVE LABOR MOVEMENTS 313-409 (W. Galenson ed. 1952)
(discussion focuses on the history and role of trade unions in France, not specifically the develop-
ment of rights of individual workers).
21. C. civ. art. 1791, quoted in DROrr DU TRAVAIL, supra note 15, at 6.
22. See Contrat de Travail, supra note 15, § 2; see also MEYERS, supra note 15, at 45-46.
23. C. civ. art. 1780 revised in C. TRAY. art. L.122-1. All provisions of the Labor Code cited
in this Comment are printed numerically in Petits Codes Dalloz (41e ed. 1982) [hereinafter P.C.D.],
reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, FRENCH LABOUR CODE (1982) (English translation
of the French Labor Code).
24. Contrat de Travail, supra note 15, at 1; Contrat de Travail, supra note 15, at 7; MEYERS,
supra note 15, at 44. Similar to Article 1780 was Article 1142 which provided that only damages
were available as a remedy for failure to act or refrain from acting; see e.g. Mouricault, Rapport du
Citoyen Mouricault in Vii RECEUIL DES Lois COMPOSANT LE CODE CIVIL 197 (1804), quoted in
MEYERS supra note 15, at 44. (Mouricault consecrates the principle of individual liberty.) The
result of this legislation was that employers were not required to continue an employment contract
they had breached because specific performance of a contract for service was prohibited by Article
1142. Employers could unilaterally terminate an employment contract, even a contract for a speci-
fied time, and remedy the employee's loss through money payments. See RECUEIL DALLOZ-SIREY,
286 (B. de Segogne ed. 1916).
25. See MEYERS, supra note 15, at 44.
26. Although the purpose of the legislation seems to have been to abolish slavery and peonage
by preventing the formation of guilds and combinations characteristic of the medieval system of
labor, the result of Article 1781 for employees was second-class status vis-a-vis the employer. See
MEYERS, supra note 15, at 44.
27. C. ciV. art. 1781 repealed by L. August 2, 1868.
28. Contrat de Travail, supra note 1, ch. 1, § 1.
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parties to an employment contract were generally considered to be on
equal footing and at arm's length distance with respect to one another.29
Egaliti civile3a aside, the master enjoyed not only a skewed allocation of
the burden of proof, but also because the servant could not rebut the
master's assertions by the production of witnesses, the master enjoyed
absolute credibility on the matter of proper wages.31
Shortly thereafter, the Law of 22 "germinal an" XI created the
"livret ouvrier."'32 The livret ouvrier was a booklet that could be retained
by the employer for the term of employment as a guaranty against ad-
vanced wages and returned to the employee at its expiration as proof that
the employee was free from any other work engagement.33 While the
livret system was justified a- a police measure against vagabondage, in
practice, the livret itself "could become an instrument of servitude."
34
Possession of the livret gave the unscrupulous employer an opportunity
to prevent a dissatisfied employee from attempting to work elsewhere.3 5
At the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the Indus-
trial Revolution, the master-servant relationship broke down.36 During
this time, freedom to contract philosophy prevailed, with its application
continuing to favor the interests of the employer over the employees as
many workers, especially women and children, had little or no bargain-
ing power.37 For the most part, employees continued to lack statutory
protection against employer abuses. 3' Article 1134 recognized only the
written terms of the agreement as representing the will of the parties.39
Employers would often bind employees to accept adhesion contracts, im-
posing unfavorable working conditions and inadequate wages.' Chil-
dren and women were, as a common practice, hired for work of a nature
determined unilaterally by the employer.4' While the courts read a re-
quirement of notice and indemnity into the contract for termination, ex-
cept when the employee was dismissed for serious misconduct,42 the
29. DRorr Du TRAVAIL, supra note 15, at 7.
30. See MEYERS, supra note 15, at 44.
31. DROIT DU TRAVAIL, supra note 15, at 7.
32. See MEYERS, supra note 15, at 46.
33. Id.; see also Lorwin, France, supra note 20, at 314; DROIT DU TRAVAIL, supra note 15, at 7.
34. Lorwin, supra note 20, at 314; DROIT DU TRAVAIL, supra note 15, at 7.
35. See MEYERS, supra note 15, at 46; Lorwin gives an additional reason for the livret law: "[it]
was justified as guaranteeing workshops against desertion, and contracts against violation." Lorwin,
supra note 20, at 314.
36. See MEYERS, supra note 15, at 46.
37. The Industrial Revolution in France began in the 1840's. For a historical discussion of the
labor movement in France see, DROIT DU TRAVAIL, supra note 15, at 7-9.
38. Id. at 7-8.
39. Id. at 6-7.
40. See Contrat de Travail supra note 1, at § 2.
41. See DROIT DU TRAVAIL, supra note 15, at 6.
42. See DROIT DU TRAVAIL, supra note 15, at 7-9.
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remedy for dismissal without notice was limited to money damages.43
This indemnity remedy was not viewed as a penalty to employers, but
rather as a means of providing for an employee's severance pay or ex-
penses while the employee searched for another job."
In 1926, the Cour de Cassation, the Supreme Court of France, recog-
nized a cause of action for holding an employer liable for abusive dis-
charge when such termination was based on a malicious intent: ldgiret
coupable or bldmable which is comparable to culpable negligence or ca-
priciousness." Each case would be decided on a case-by-case basis to
determine whether or not the discharge was capricious or malicious."
Where the discharge followed employee illness or absence and the em-
ployer did not produce any other justification for the discharge, courts
would occasionally award damages limited to the amount of pay for the
period of notice.47 Where the facts contained clear evidence of abuses,
the courts would readily find the employer liable. 8 For example, a dis-
charge motivated purely by personal reasons, such as the dismissal of an
employee who refused to testify at his employer's divorce proceedings,
was and still is the kind of abusive discharge suit that would succeed. 9
This principle of abus de droit or the employer's abuse of its right to
discharge was finally adopted by statute in 1928.30
II. Abus de Droit
A. Legislative Intervention
The Law of 1928 codified the principle of abus de droit as it applied
to individual employment relationships.5 The three major developments
in French labor law subsequent to the enactment of the Law of 1928
were: (1) the elaboration of special rules surrounding dismissal and re-
versal of the traditional burden of proof for a few specific categories of
employees; (2) the evolution of a more liberal burden of proof require-
ment, which favored the employee; and (3) the enactment of a new law in
1958 providing for longer minimum periods of notice. 2 Judicial devel-
opment of the doctrine of abuse of right, over time, carved out exceptions
43. See, e.g., I RECEUIL DALLOZ SIREY I 57 (1859). (Provides doctrine, legislation with com-
mentaries, selected jurisdictions reported).
44. See MEYERS, supra note 15, at 48.
45. Id.
46. See 2 RECEUIL DALLOZ-SIREY 40 (B. de Segogne ed. 1904).
47. See MEYERS, supra note 1, at 55.
48. E.g., I RECEUIL DALLOZ 35 (1922); 1 RECEUIL DALLOZ 503 (1906); 1 RECEUIL DALLOZ
155 (1902); 2 RECEUIL DALLOZ 441 (1897).
49. 1 RECEUIL DALLOZ 94 (1920).
50. Id.
51. The Law of July 19, 1928 is codified and is available in D.H. 1928.
52. See MEYERS, supra note 15, at 58-59.
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to the rule of employment-at-will so that pregnancy, illness, engaging in a
lawful strike, mere participation in employee representation organiza-
tions (for example, as a shop steward or in the works council), political
beliefs, personal pique or dislike, and the exercise of citizenship rights no
longer formed the basis for a lawful dismissal.
53
The scope of protection accorded individual workers under the
French doctrine of abuse of right does not extend as far as the protection
accorded workers in U.S. arbitration proceedings. In U.S. arbitration
proceedings, the burden of showing "good cause" is placed on the em-
ployer.54 By contrast, the French doctrine places the burden of proof on
the dismissed employee, requiring the employer to show that the em-
ployer abused its right of dismissal.55
Nevertheless, the French courts appear more willing than American
courts to find that a dismissal was arbitrary or capricious.5 6 For exam-
ple, employers are required to give the French court a reason for the
dismissal; courts have often found the employer's reason to be mere pre-
text for unfair dismissal.57 Furthermore, the French courts have ex-
tended the doctrine of abuse of right to situations in which the employer
failed to follow customary or collectively bargained procedures and
rules.5" Reinstatement, however, is never a remedy for an abusive dis-
charge; only damages may be obtained. 59
B. The ILO Recommendation
The member states of the International Labor Organization (ILO)
adopted Recommendation No. 119 on the Termination of Employment
at the 1963 International Labor Conference.6' The purpose of the Rec-
ommendation was to provide workers with some kind of safeguard
against the termination of employment at the initiative of the employer. 61
53. Id.
54. See Summers, Individual Protection, supra note I1, at 481.
55. Id. at 510.
56. See C. TRAY. art. L. 122-14-3. See, e.g., Judgment of June 25, 1975, Cass. civ. soc., 4 Bull.
Civ. VI 306 (de facto serious cause for dismissal because the employee did not address the issue of
employer's alleged serious cause for dismissal); See generally 4 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA
FOR LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS § 222 (R. Blanpain ed. 1977) [hereinafter INTER-
NATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA] (Blanpain surveys all of the major provisions of the French dismissal
statute and analyzes how each of the provisions operates and interacts with the entirety of the
French Labor Code.)
57. See MEYERS, supra note 15, at 62.
58. See 2 LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE (JURIS CLASSEUR PERIODIQUE) 11052 (R. Dorat des
Monts, J. Hugot, & H. Thuillier eds. 1959) (a general source, providing practice guides, theory and
doctrine; selected jurisdictions reported).
59. See MEYERS, supra note 15, at 63.
60. See Summers, Individual Protection, supra note 11, at 510.
61. Approximately twenty years after the Recommendation was issued by the ILO, the item of
employment termination at the initiative of the employer was reexamined. At the 1982 ILO Confer-
ence, ILO Convention No. 158 was ratified. Member states voluntarily become signatories to a
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The Recommendation extended to "all branches of economic activity
and all categories of workers" but excluded workers engaged for a speci-
fied period, temporary workers, probationary workers, and civil
servants.62
The Recommendation set forth guidelines requiring that employers
advance a valid reason for termination. Under these guidelines, the em-
ployer may not base a dismissal on an employee's union membership or
representation on race, color, sex, marital status, religion, political opin-
ion, national or social origin.63 In addition, the Recommendation re-
quired the employer to give the employee notice or compensation in lieu
of notice, as well as time off from work during the notice period to seek
other employment." Finally, the employer must provide the employee
with severance pay and a certificate of dismissal.65
If, however, the termination is for serious misconduct, the employee
will be deemed to have waived her right to notice or compensation.
66
But before the termination for serious misconduct becomes final, the em-
ployee must have an opportunity, within a reasonable amount of time, to
go before a neutral tribunal to state his or her case.6' The decision of this
body can, in turn, be appealed.68 On the other hand, if the employer
does not dismiss the employee for serious misconduct within a reasonable
amount of time after becoming aware of such conduct, the employer
waives the right to dismiss the employee for that particular instance of
misconduct.69 If the court or arbitration tribunal find the evidence of
serious misconduct to be insufficient or that the employer did not act in
good faith, the employee is entitled to damages.7°
1. The Report from France on ILO Recommendation No. 119
Prior to adopting the Recommendation, France sought to limit the
specific Convention with the obligation to implement it in their state. As a forerunner to the Con-
vention, the Recommendation, not binding on member states, provides much more detailed language
and guidelines on the topic. Much of the language of Convention No. 158 is drawn from Recom-
mendation No. 119. Compare INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, 68TH SESSION, 1982: RE-
PORT VIII(2)--CONCERNING TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT AT THE INITIATIVE OF THE
EMPLOYER [EIGHTH ITEM ON THE AGENDA] 85-129 (1981) [hereinafter REPORT], with INTERNA-
TIONAL LABOR CONFERENCE, RECORD OF 67TH SESSION, 1982: REPORT VIII(I)-TERMINATION
OF EMPLOYMENT AT THE INITIATIVE OF THE EMPLOYER [EIGHTH ITEM ON THE AGENDA] 102-
105 (1980) (reprint of the text of the 1963 Recommendation).
62. See Bellace, supra note I1, at 211.
63. Recommendation, supra note 61, Part IV § 18.
64. Id., at pt. II § 3(d).
65. Id. at pt. II § 8(1).
66. Id. at pt. II § 9.
67. Id. at pt. II § 11(1).
68. Id. at pt. II § 11 (5).
69. Id. at pt. II § 11(3).
70. Id. at pt. II § 11(2).
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discretionary power of the employer to terminate through a judicial no-
tion of abuse of right.7 ' Once France became a signatory to the Recom-
mendation, however, it undertook the task of applying the
Recommendation to all French laws and regulations.7 2 It deserves men-
tion that while the French government, in its report, adopted all substan-
tive provisions of the Recommendation, it omitted marital status and
political opinion as unlawful reasons for termination.71 Writing the re-
port to the ILO spurred compliance with the Recommendation so that
shortly after the French government sent its report to the ILO, it.
amended its Labor Code with respect to termination of an indefinite em-
ployment contract.74
Pressure from the unions, an increase in sensitivity to the persisting
problems of job security and official impetus from the adoption of ILO
Recommendation No. 119 led the French government to amend its dis-
missal statute for the first time.75 Codified as Title II of the Labor Code,
the Law of 1973 requires the utilization of procedural safeguards and
provides for judicial review of the employer's decision to terminate an
employee.76 An important goal of the statute was to provide protection
against arbitrary dismissal." The Law of 1973, however, was incomplete
in its scope as it did not address the problem posed by economically mo-
tivated dismissals.7" To remedy this defect, the legislature passed the
Law of 1975, in order to complete the scheme of protection by providing
for protection for employees dismissed for economic reasons.79
Neither statute, however, addressed the concerns of those employees
whose status is governed by contracts of employment for a specified
amount of time. The scope of the Act of 1973 extends only to the con-
tract of employment for an indefinite duration. 0 This defect was reme-
71. See supra notes 46-50, and accompanying text.
72. France reported in 1974 that the whole of the Recommendation applied to French laws and
regulations: "the whole of the Recommendation is applied, by virtue of laws or regulations, custom,
collective agreements or decision by the courts." INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE (59TH
SESSION), TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT (1974) (summary of reports on Recommendation no.
119 (article 19 of the constitution) [hereinafter Summary]).
73. See id.
74. See C. civ. art. 73-680.
75. See id.
76. C. civ. art. 73-680 amending the Labor Code with respect to termination of an indefinite
employment contract was adopted within months of the drafting of the Report to be sent to the ILO.
The ILO Summary of Reports covers reports received by that office up to November 1, 1973. See
Summary, supra note 72, Introduction.
77. DROIT Du TRAVAIL, supra note 15, at 151; Contrat de Travail, supra note 15, at 9.
78. DROIT Du TRAVAIL, supra note 15, at 151.
79. See generally INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA, supra note 56, at § 203. Blanpain briefly
discusses the historical context in which the Law of 1975 was passed. The focus of this Comment,
however, is on dismissal for reasons personal to the worker, such as misconduct, and not for eco-
nomic reasons. Therefore, this Comment will not address the Law of 1975 in a detailed fashion.
80. See id.
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died by the Act of 1979, which regulates contracts of employment of
definite duration.8 In practice, the 1979 statute has proven to offer em-
ployees the same level of protection for the specified term of the contract
provided for in the earlier legislation.82
Despite the liberal intent underlying each of the dismissal statutes,
many commentators have criticized the French labor law in this area for
both its complexity and its failure to implement real safeguards.83
C. Mechanics Of The Law Of Dismissal Of 1973
The laws of dismissal incorporated into Title II of the Labor Code
provide two kinds of permissible dismissals: dismissal motivated by a
genuine and serious cause (cause rielle et sdrieuse) and dismissal moti-
vated by economic factors."
1. The Law of 1973.
The Act of 1973 preserves the right of the employer to dismiss.8"
Nevertheless, an employee can challenge a dismissal as a wrongful dis-
charge by bringing suit in a labor court, the Conseil des Prud'hommes,
composed of lay persons elected to serve as judges of labor disputes by
employers and employees.86 All of the provisions of the Act of 1973
apply to all workers covered by an individual employment contract in
France and all workers covered by an individual employment contract
with a French company but providing their labor for a foreign subsidi-
ary.8 7 If an employee in the latter case is dismissed by the subsidiary, the
parent (French) company must provide the employee with the same pro-
81. See Camerlynck, supra note 15, § 2 (outlines the authority and scope of the Law of 1973).
82. See Corrighan-Carsin, Contrat de Travail, in DALLOZ ENCYCLOPtDIE JURIDIQUE, RIPER-
TOIRE DE DROIT DU TRAVAIL §§ 41-297 (1976) (chapter, Contrat de Travail i Dure Determine6,
outlines the authority and scope of the Law of 1975). For a thorough comparison of the implications
of the contract of employment for a determined duration and the contract of employment for an
undetermined duration before the enactment of the Law of 1973 and the Law of 1975 see G. Pou-
LAIN, LA DISTINCTION DES CONTRATS DE TRAVAIL A DURfE DETERMINtE ET INDtETERMINEE
(1971).
83. See Rojot, Protection Against Unfair Dismissal in France, in PROTECTING UNORGANIZED
EMPLOYEES AGAINST UNJUST DISCHARGE 147 (J. Stieber & J. Blackburn eds. 1983) (Rojot briefly
outlines the mechanics of the French Labor Code).
84. Rojot sharply criticizes the French Act of 1973 as raising "more legal problems than it has
solved." Rojot, supra note 83, at 50. But Rojot concludes: "the Act (of 1973] serves as a useful
reminder to all parts of management that terminating a worker is an important decision which
should be taken seriously after due consideration and due process." Id. at 53. He goes on to add:
"Whatever its [Act of 1973] faults, it has improved the job security of individual employees without
too many undue constraints on the employer's freedom to manage." Id.
85. See INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA, supra note 56, at 92.
86. Id. at 204. For a discussion of the Conseils des Prud'hommes system, see Rojot, France in 9
COMP. LAB. L.J. 70, 70-77 (1987) (special issue on role of neutrals in the resolution of shop floor
disputes).
87. For a full discussion of the structure and mechanics Qf the French labor courts see W.
MCPHERSON & F. MEYERS, THE FRENCH LABOR COURTS: JUDGMENT BY PEERS (1966).
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cedures for dismissal guaranteed to all other French workers discussed
below."8 However, notice rules, penalties for non-compliance with pro-
cedure and for dismissal without a genuine and serious cause provided by
the Act of 1973 do not apply to collective layoffs for economic reasons,
dismissals in enterprises with fewer than eleven employees, or instances
where the worker has less than one credited year of seniority. Workers
with less than one year tenure are not entitled to either a hearing prior to
dismissal or a letter from the employer stating the grounds for
dismissal.8 9
2. The Contract of an Indeterminate Duration
The procedures for dismissal in a contract of indeterminate duration
are set forth in Section L. 122-14 and Section R. 122-2 of the Labor
Code."° The procedural framework consists primarily of three stages or
phases.9'
a. Preliminary Phase. Before the case is heard, the employer must
initiate a conciliatory session with the prud'hommes of the labor court
acting as mediators.92 The purpose of the mandatory conciliation ses-
sion, as articulated by the reporter of the legislation at the National As-
sembly, was that "a true dialogue could take place and would lead
eventually to a solution of the problem without the inevitability of dis-
missal."93 The employer must send a letter to the employee announcing
the time, place and purpose of the meeting.94 Both parties must appear
in person at the session.9" Technical assistance is available to the em-
ployee in preparation for the informal session. 96 The employee's assis-
tant, who must be a coworker, will not have his or her salary reduced by
any time spent assisting the dismissed employee.
97
b. Notice of Dismissal. If the employer wishes to dismiss the em-
ployee instead of applying the lesser penalty recommended by the concil-
iatory commission, the employer must notify the employee of the
88. See INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 56, at 92.
89. Id. For example, the employee must be provided with the same protective procedural rules
of Section L. 122-14-3, notice or compensation in lieu of notice. (codified in CODE DU TRAVAIL
supra note 23, at L. 122-14-3).
90. See INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA, supra note 56, at § 205.
91. C. TRAY. D.P.C. (1979); INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, FRENCH LABOR CODE (1982).
92. In his note to Contrat de Travail d Duree Indeterminde, Camerlynck arranges the mechan-
ics of the Law of 1973 in stages or procedural phases. See Camerlynck, supra note 15, at 69-106,
see also INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA, supra note 56, at 201-244 (INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLO-
PAEDIA arranges the analysis of the Law of 1973 by the nature of the dismissal, for example justified
dismissal, unlawful dismissal).
93. See Camerlynck, Contrat due Travail, supra note 15, at § 69.
94. Journal Official Deb. Ass. Nat., May 23, 1973 quoted in Camerlynck, supra note 15, at § 70.
95. See Camerlynck, Contrat de Travail, supra note 15, at 72.
96. Id. at 73.
97. Id. at 86.
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dismissal by letter but may remain silent as to the reason for the dismis-
sal.9" Unless the employee committed a major offense, the employer
must honor a pre-determined grace period of time between the notice of
dismissal and the actual termination of the employment agreement. 99
While this period of time is fixed by law, it can be improved upon (i.e.
lengthened) by custom and agreement."° During this time, the em-
ployee has the right to take off two hours of work a day to seek alterna-
tive employment.'O
c. Declaration of genuine and serious cause (cause rdelle et sir-
ieuse). Upon the demand by an employee, the employer must send a
letter to the employee providing specific reasons for the dismissal. 02 The
employee's demand must be made within ten days of the date of termina-
tion.'03 The date the employer mails the registered letter announcing its
intent to dismiss the employee initiates the notice period.'o" The em-
ployer's letter must include a description of the genuine and serious cause
justifying the dismissal.'05 The letter, in turn, must be sent to the em-
ployee within ten days of the date of receipt of request from the em-
ployee. '6 The purpose of allowing this delay in the employer's response
is to permit the employer a short cooling-off period to ensure that the
dismissal notice was not the result of a hot-headed decision.10 7
d. Evidence of Genuine and Serious Cause. In practice, but not by
law, the employer must carry the burden of persuading the judge that the
cause of the dismissal was serious.'o' The employee is no longer required
to prove the absence of genuine or serious cause but benefits by produc-
ing evidence that the reason for dismissal asserted by the employer is
pretextual. '9
3. The Contract of a Determined Duration
The contract of determined duration, by definition, has its duration
fixed by the occurrence of a certain future event. Its expiration does not
depend entirely on the will of the parties. | o Such contract, is in this
98. Id. at 77.
99. Id. at 88.
100. Id. at 94.
101. See INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA, supra note 57, at 94.
102. Id. at 95.
103. See Camerlynck, Contrat de Travail. supra note 15, at 88.
104. Id. at $ 88.
105. Id. at 1 103.
106. Id.
107. INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA, note 56, at 95.
108. See Camerlynck, Contrat de Travail. supra note 15, at 226-228, see also INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPAEDIA, supra note 56, at § 215.
109. See Camerlynck, Contrat de Travail, supra note 15, at 222-228.
110. Corrighan-Carsitn supra note 82, at 1 107.
COMPARATIVE LABOR LAW JOURNAL
regard, distinguishable from the contract for an undetermined dura-
tion. I I I Employees, under contract law, indirectly enjoy some of the ben-
efits provided to the employees with indeterminate contracts covered by
the Act of 1979.112 For example, a contract for a determined duration
may be "suspended" because of the employee's absence from work due to
illness, injury or pregnancy. 1 3 But the suspension period ends and the
contract becomes effective again as soon as the employee returns to
work. 4
Neither the employer nor the employee may unilaterally terminate a
contract for a determined duration. I5 Dismissal, under this kind of con-
tract, is treated as nonperformance of the employer's obligation." 6 An
employer may seek to dismiss an employee judicially. 17 That is, an em-
ployer must provide evidence to a court that the employee has commit-
ted serious misconduct and has therefore failed to perform under the
contract." 8 If the employer fails to produce sufficient evidence of serious
misconduct, but nevertheless dismisses the employee, the court will often
set damages at the amount of pay the employee would have received as
wages had the contract run its specified duration. 19
D. Judicial Applications Of The Concept Of Genuine And Serious
Cause (Cause R6elle et Sirieuse)
An employee who chooses to sue the employer for wrongful dismis-
sal generally takes the claim to a labor court.' 2 The labor courts are
organized by sections corresponding to different categories of occupa-
tions.'" ' The judges, comprised of an equal number of the elected repre-
sentatives of employers and employees, are elected from the occupations
controlled by each court's jurisdiction.'22 This arrangement ensures that
the judges are familiar with the custom and practice of the industry in-
volved in the dispute. 23 One commentator has noted that the work of
scholars, "consists of elucidating, organizing and systematizing [the La-
Ill. Id.
112. Corrighan-Carsin, supra note 82, at 1 203.
113. Id. at 1221.
114. Id. at 1 203, 222.
115. Id. at I 198, 203.
116. Id. at 1203.
117. See generally id. at 1 51-140, 207 (The application of the Law of 1979 results in much of
the same protection the Law of 1973 offers.)
118. Rojot, supra note 83, at 149.
119. Id. at 148.
120. Id.
121. Id. (If a contract for a determined duration is continually renewed, that is, more than once,
it will be treated by the courts as in fact being of undetermined duration.)
122. See Summers, Individual Protection, supra note 11, at 510.
123. See, W. MCPHERSON & F. MEYERS, supra note 87.
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bor Code]."' 24 Furthermore, French judges have the task of adapting
traditional jurisprudence to the concept of social right while taking into
account the needs and characteristics of employment relations.' 25  Re-
marking on the treatment of the statute by the courts, Ewald, a noted
commentator, stated:
The right to work in France is much more than the filling up of
lacunae of statutory or civil law on the matter of labor; instead, it rep-
resents a judicial invention, itself linked to the transformation of polit-
ical rationality which governs us all. The right to work presents
another type of right and another way of decision-making. The right
to work in France is the increasing accumulation of legalities and rules
ever more precise, complex and detailed. These legalities embody the
positive rights of workers. These rights do not announce a great deal
of principles; but rather they announce a fountain of fussy prescrip-
tions destined to circumscribe in the most precise and fastidious man-
ner the ways in which workers may and may not exercise their
rights. 1
2 6
A few examples of this ad hoc, yet most detailed, approach of French
labor courts and tribunals to the application of the dismissal statutes will
be illustrative.
Recently, the French Supreme Court held that a supermarket em-
ployee who stole a pair of shoelaces after his workshift from his em-
ployer's store could be dismissed for serious misconduct even though the
employee was no longer under the employer's authority. 127  This case
provoked a great deal of criticism because the finding of dismissal for real
and serious cause deprives the employee of notice or compensation in lieu
of notice.
121
In Tscheiller v. Office d'Hygiine Sociale de Meurthe-et-Moselle,
129
the employer stated he dismissed the employee because the employee
spoke out against the employer at work regarding the employer's choice
as to location of the worksite. The employer argued that the dismissal
124. Ewald, Le Droit du Travail: Une Ldgalitd Sans Droit, [19851 DROIT SOCIAL, 723, 727
[hereinafter DR. SOC.].
125. Id.
126. See Ewald, supra note 124, at 727.
127. Judgment of February 20, 1986, CAss. civ. soc., [1986] DR. Soc. 239.
128. Laroque, Reflexions sur la Jurisprudence de la Chambre Sociale de la Cour de Cassation, in
ETUDES CAMERLYNCK 28 (1978) quoted in Ewald, supra note 124, at 728. See Pelissier, Ambiguitis
et Logique du Contr6le de la Cour de Cassation, [1986] DR. SOC. 179. (Pelissier states: ". . the
Supreme Court controls the interpretation and application of the legal rule.") Cf Dupeyroux, Deux
Observations Preliminaires, [1986] DR. SOC. 176. (The author argues that Judgment of February 20,
1986, CASS. civ. soc., [1986] DR. Soc. 179 represents a great departure from the provisions of the
Labor Code.) See also Savatier, La Paire de Lacets ou Les Limites de la Faute Grave, [1986] DR.
Soc. 236, 236 ("La solution a choqui notre sentiment de la justice." Trans: "The resolution shocks
our concept of justice.") (The author criticizes the penalty for petit larceny imposed upon the em-
ployee, that is dismissal without notice or grounds for damages, as disproportionate to the crime
committed.).
129. Judgment of December 10, 1985, CASS. CIV. SOC., [1986] DR. Soc. 209.
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was justified as a dismissal for a real and serious cause.' 3° The employee
claimed the true reason for the dismissal was his participation in worker
representative elections.31  The Court, in reviewing the record of the
facts as determined by the court below, found that in fact the employee
had committed a series of acts which were injurious to the functioning of
the office and held that this was sufficient to establish serious misconduct
for lawful dismissal. 1
32
In Ste. d'Exploitation des Ets. Erba. v. Arsac, i3 3 the employee, a
ship-painter, refused to perform temporary work in an outside shipyard.
The Court, taking into account the lower court's findings regarding the
customs and practices of the shipbuilding industry, held that the flexibil-
ity and mobility required by the industry justified the employee's dismis-
sal for serious misconduct.
134
In Blaze v. SARL O'Connor,3 the employer dismissed the employee
for serious misconduct because the employee, Mrs. Blaze a salesperson
and a coworker and the wife of the office supervisor, created tension at
work. The Court held that the supervisor had sufficient cause, in assur-
ing the normal functioning of the enterprise, to dismiss Mrs. Blaze and
deny her claim for damages.
136
As the above cases illustrate, the judicial trend in France seems to
favor a restricted application of the concept of unjust cause. The result is
a standard from which the employer benefits. Yet, the standard in
France is more generous to the employee than the judicial standards used
by U.S. courts in unlawful dismissal cases.' 37
III. United States
The employment-at-will doctrine in the United States has dubious




133. Judgment of December 11, 1985, CASS. cIv. soc., Id. at 210.
134. Id. (The Court held that a dismissal for serious cause does not bar an employee's right to
compensation).
135. Judgment of December 10, 1985, CASS. cv. sOc., Id.
136. Cf Judgment of December 11, 1985, CASS. civ. soc., [1986] DR. Soc. 211, (the employee
was dismissed for excessive absences which were said to disrupt the general operation of the enter-
prise, but the Court held that although adequate grounds for serious misconduct were found, the
absences were not sufficiently serious to justify dismissal without compensation).
137. For the most recent legislative and judicial developments to date in French law in the area
of dismissal see Ray, Le Nouveau Droit du Licenciement, [1987] DR. Soc. 664; Chelle et Pr6tot, Le
Champ d'Application de I'Autorisation Administrative de Licenciement des Salaris Protdges, (1987]
DR. SoC. 686; Belier, Le Contrat de Travail d Duroe Inditerminde Intermittent, [1987] DR. Soc. 696.
138. St. Antoine, The Twilight of Employment at Will? An Update, in NEW DIMENSIONS IN
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW INSTITUTE 2 (W. Dol-
son ed. 1985); Summers, Individual Protection, supra note 11, at 485.
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the rule in 1877:
[W]ith us the rule is inflexible that a general or indefinite hiring is
prima facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a
yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof. A hiring
at so much a day, week, month, or year, no time being specified, is an
indefinite hiring, and no presumption attaches that it was for a day
even, but only at the rate fixed for whatever time the party may
serve. 1
39
By the end of the nineteenth century, courts often quoted the rule: "all
[employers] may dismiss their employees at will, be they many or few, for
good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong, without being
thereby guilty of legal wrong."'" A constitutional basis for this "at-
will" doctrine was articulated by the United States Supreme Court in
Adair v. United States.
14'
A. Judicial Erosion Of The Employment-At-Will Doctrine
Three theories have been used by courts to attack the employment-
at-will doctrine: a tort theory, a contract theory and a public policy the-
ory. 1 42 The finding of "abusive" discharge is based on a theory most
similar to the French theory of abus de droit.43
1. Tort Theory
In Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.,144 the New Hampshire Supreme
Court held that a dismissal motivated by bad faith or malice or based on
retaliation, constituted a breach of the employment contract, which the
court reasoned was contrary to the best interest of the economic system.
The court emphasized the particularly arbitrary and capricious nature of
the dismissal: "the foreman's overtures (to the female employee) and the
capricious firing at 2:00 a.m., the seeming manipulation of job assign-
ments, and the apparent connivance of the personnel manager in this
course of events all support the jury's conclusion that the dismissal was
maliciously motivated."'
145
139. See H. WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT, 272 (1877); see also Hathaway v. Bennett, 10 N.Y.
108 (1854) and Perry v. Wheeler, 75 Ky. (12 Bush) 541 (1877).
140. Payne v. Western & A.R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-520 (1884); see also Martin v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895).
141. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
142. See St. Antoine, supra note 138, at 5-13; see also Keyes, supra note 15, at 149-153. (Both
authors describe the current theories courts have been using to base decisions that go against the
employment-at-will rule.).
143. See note 45 and accompanying text.
144. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
145. Id. at 134, 316 A.2d at 552.
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In Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co.,146 the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that the discharge of an employee because of the employee's
political views and his refusal to lobby the state legislature on the em-
ployer's behalf implicated a public policy under Pennsylvania law and
therefore constituted a wrongful discharge.' 47 This case is significant be-
cause the court explicitly recognized that a new standard had developed.
[T]he inquiry before us is whether the concern for the rights of
political expression and association which animated the public em-
ployee cases is sufficient to state a public policy under Pennsylvania
law. While there are no Pennsylvania cases on this point, we believe
that the clear direction of the opinions promulgated by the state's
courts suggests that this question be answered in the affirmative.14
8
In Smith v. Atlas Off-Shore Boat Service, Inc.,'49 the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that an employer's dismissal in retaliation for a
seaman's exercise of his legal right to file a personal injury action against
his employer constituted abusive firing.'50 These decisions show a will-
ingness by some courts to see in the employment relationship an obliga-
tion by the reasonable employer not to discharge employees in bad faith.
2. Contract Theory
In Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan,'' the Michi-
gan Supreme Court held that procedures published in a company's per-
sonnel policy handbook established a basis for protection against unjust
discharge. The court further extended procedural protection to employ-
ees who relied on oral statements made by the employer regarding just
cause for dismissal. Thus, the Michigan court observed:
[W]hen a prospective employee inquires about job security and the em-
ployer agrees that the employee shall be employed as long as he does
the job, a fair construction is that the employer has agreed to give up
his right to discharge at will without assigning cause and may dis-
charge only for cause (good or just cause) .... The result is that the
employee, if discharged without good or just cause, may maintain an
action for wrongful discharge.'
5 2
This sort of case is a corollary to those cases arguing under a contract
146. 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983), 114 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3105 (no. 83-5101, Slip Op. 3d Cir.
October 26, 1986) (per curiam).
147. Id.
148. Novosel, 721 F.2d at 901.
149. 653 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1981).
150. Id. at 1063. But cf Howard v. Dorr Woolen Company, 414 A.2d 1273 (N.H. 1980) (dis-
missal due to age or sickness does not fall into the Monge category "where an employee is discharged
because he performed an act that public policy would encourage, or refused to do that which public
policy would condemn").
151. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
152. Id. at 581, 292 N.W.2d 881.
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theory that express or implied promises of just cause may be enforced. ' 3
3. Public Policy Theory
Another theory adopted by courts is based on public policy con-
cerns. This theory incorporates features of both the tort and contract
theories. For example, in Cloutier v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Com-
pany, Inc.,'54 the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that a store man-
ager met a two part test in showing that the employer was motivated by
bad faith, malice, or retaliation and that the employer violated a public
policy giving rise to a wrongful discharge cause of action. 5 These judi-
cially recognized theories of tort, contract and public policy exceptions to
the employment-at-will doctrine are important as they can provide the
impetus for other courts to rule similarly and further erode the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine.
B. Legislative Intervention In The United States
State Law. To date, no state except Montana has enacted legislation
protecting all employees from unjust discharge. 156 A number of states
have, however, enacted statutes providing some protection to employees
terminated for certain reasons. 157 Moreover, legislation intended to nar-
row the scope of the employment-at-will doctrine has been proposed in
several states. ' 8 At least one state has modeled its statutes after arbitra-
153. See Rasch v. City of East Jordan, 141 Mich. App. 336, 367 N.W.2d 856 (Mich. App. 1985)
(employee's knowledge of just cause termination policy sufficient to establish cause of action for
wrongful discharge); Hrab v. Hayes-Albion Corporation, 103 Mich. App. 90, 302 N.W.2d 606
(Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (oral representation to employee by employer that he would be discharged
only for good cause could be enforced as an implied contract). But see Ford v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Michigan, 389 N.W.2d 116, 150 Mich. Ct. App. 522 (1986) (employer practice stated in
policy handbook of offering dismissed employee opportunity to be heard in "exit interview" was not
sufficient to create an implied contract for just cause dismissal).
154. 121 N.H. 915, 436 A.2d 1140 (1981).
155. But see Percival v. General Motors Corporation, 400 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D. Mo. 1975), aff'd,
539 F.2d 1126 (8th Cir. 1976) (public policy exception not extended to recognize claim for wrongful
discharge for trying to correct misleading information); see also Geary v. United States Steel Corpo-
ration, 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974) (employee alleged that he was dismissed for expressing
reservations to his employer regarding the safety of its products; Pennsylvania high court refused to
apply the public policy exception but indicated it would under the proper circumstances.).
156. See generally, REPORT ON EMPLOYMENT AT WILL (BNA) (1984); Stieber, Termination of
Employment in the United States, 5 CoMP. LAB. L. 327, 334-335 (1982); Summers, Individual ra-
tection, supra note 11, at 481; Wald & Wolf, Recent Developments in the Law of Employment at Will,
I LAB. LAW. 533 (1985). Montana has recently passed a wrongful discharge statute. See 39-2
MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 39-2, §§ 901-905, 911-914 (1987).
157. E.g., jury duty, testifying in criminal trials, doing military or reserve duty, obtaining mental
health treatment, or filing worker's compensation claims. DeGiuseppe, The Effect of the Employ-
ment-at- Will Rule on Employee Rights to Job Security and Fringe Benefits, 10 FORDHAM URs. L.J.
1, 20-21. Because these statutes do not relate to the more common dismissal scenario, they will not
be addressed in this Comment.
158. Two examples of these state statutes are Assembly Bill .1 165 which was considered by the
California Assembly in 1983 which provided for relief if termination was found to be in breach of an
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tion procedures commonly provided for in collective bargaining agree-
ments. 5 9 These procedures would permit an employee to appeal a
discharge to an arbitration panel."0 The purpose of these legislative pro-
posals is to allow individual employees the recourse to an impartial panel
for relief currently available only to unionized employees under collective
bargaining agreements.
16 1
Federal Law. A noted scholar in this area has argued that dismissal
legislation more appropriately should be enacted at the state level rather
than the federal level.162 Scholars have urged the enactment of a federal
statute protecting at-will or non-unionized employees as the preferable
vehicle for reform. 1
63
State legislation may appear more desirable because it permits
greater experimentation and variety before comprehensive federal legisla-
tion is enacted.1'6 Also, state legislation presents a more practical forum
for test legislation, such as dismissal statutes, because headway may be
more easily made through progressive state legislatures than through the
more cumbersome process of enacting federal legislation. 165 Federal leg-
islation, on the other hand, has its unique advantages.' 6 No single state
may want to suffer the consequences of making itself less attractive to
commercial and industrial investors and employers by imposing a more
restrictive discharge rule on its citizens than exists in other states. 167 The
scope of any such federal statute should be limited to discharge actions.
The statute could then be amended or modified in order to incorporate
additional coverage against all unjust discipline in the future. 168 The fed-
eral statute should not define "just cause" but should rather leave the
term open to an application of the industrial common law definition of
just cause.
1 69
implied contract and not based upon fair and honest cause or reason; and Senate Bill 2317 consid-
ered by the California Senate also in 1983, which had the same provisions.
159. See Summers, Individual Protection, supra note 11, at 501. (Professor Clyde Summers re-
marks on the principles underlying discipline and discharge cases followed by arbitrators.).
160. See generally, Summers, Individual Protection, supra note 11, at 481-503; 2 COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS & CONT. (BNA) 51:1 (1979) (survey of voluntary grievance
procedures).
161. See supra note 160.
162. See, e.g., Summers, Individual Protection, supra note 11, at 481-533.
163. Stieber & Murray, supra note 11, at 337.
164. Id., at 336.
165. Id. at 336.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 338.
168. Id at 336.
169. Id. at 337.
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C. The Need For Reform: Inadequacy of Federal Anti-
discrimination Legislation as Judged by International Standards
Domestic legal scholars have supported the erosion of the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine. 7 ° On the other hand, some scholars have argued
against its demise claiming that most employers do not unfairly dismiss
workers.17 These scholars argue that statutes already in existence such
as Title VII, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, the Rehabilitation Act and other statutes that
protect against dismissal for discriminatory reasons provide adequate
protection in the most egregious cases of abusive discharge. 7 2 Yet, the
ILO Recommendation No. 119 and the subsequent Convention No. 158
on the same topic provide more protection than that currently afforded
U.S. workers under the various federal statutes mentioned. For example,
Title VII extends protection to U.S. employees discharged on the basis of
race, color, sex, pregnancy, religion, or national extraction. 73 Title VII,
in contrast to the ILO Recommendation and Convention, does not ex-
tend to discharges based on social origin, political opinion, or marital
status. '
74
In the area of discharge for temporary absence from work, non-un-
ionized employees are subject to the unilateral determination of the em-
ployer. 17' That is, there are no clear guidelines for an employer to follow
in the United States regarding what constitutes a temporary absence
from work not justifying dismissal. 76 In fact, the at-will doctrine makes
such guidelines irrelevant. Therefore, employees are left with no guaran-
tee that an employer will not set unreasonable or arbitrary boundaries on
the length of an employee's leave of absence. 77 By contrast, the ILO
Convention, in Article 6, declares that temporary absence from work
does not constitute a valid reason for discharge. 78 The Convention does
not, however, state a guideline as to what amount of time would consti-
170. See supra note II. (Proposed legislation, articles and notes arguing for reform in this area
are cited). Many of the proposals set forth in this section are generally derived from St. Antoine's
work previously cited in infra note 138 and Bellace supra note 11.
171. See, e.g., Blumrosen, Exploring Voluntary Arbitration of Individual Employment Disputes,
16 U. MICH. J.L. REV. 249 (1983); Epstein, In Defense of the Contract At Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV.
947 (1984); Note, Challenging the Employment-At- Will Doctrine Through Modern Contract Theory,
16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 449 (1983); Rosen, Commentary: In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U.
CHI. L. REV. (1984).
172. Id.
173. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000E-2 (1982). See. e.g., Yuhas v. Libby-Owens-Ford Co.,, 562 F.2d 496
(7th Cir. 1977) (court held company policy of prohibiting employment of married couple valid pro-
vided company gave couple choice as to which person should resign).
174. Bellace, supra note 11, at 214.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Convention, supra note 61, art. 6(l).
178. Id.
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tute a reasonable temporary absence.' 79 Article 6 delegates to each sig-
natory nation the task of outlining the specifics of what constitutes a
temporary absence in accordance with the practices and customs of its
domestic law.' 8 ° Nevertheless, this provision guarantees the employee
some modicum of reasonableness in discharge determinations, as op-
posed to the United States approach favoring the unilateral prerogative
of the employer.
Under ILO Convention No. 158, the employee is also entitled to an
opportunity to defend against punishment in the form of dismissal before
the dismissal is a fait accompli. At a hearing before an impartial body,
the employee is given the opportunity to defend against the employer's
allegations of poor performance or misconduct.' The United States
does not offer any parallel opportunity to non-unionized workers; it has
relegated disciplinary discharges to the absolute discretion of the em-
ployer.' 82 In addition, the ILO guidelines place the burden of proof on
the employer to show the discharge was based on a valid reason; or in the
alternative they require that the arbitration committee determine the rea-
son based on the facts.' Given the loss dismissal constitutes for em-
ployees, employers should have a valid reason to dismiss. To impose this
obligation on an employer is not unreasonable.
D. Implementing Statutory Protection
Implementation of a statutory guarantee against unjust dismissal in
the United States could be achieved through a uniform state statute.
Every state could adopt a statute that provides that "every employee has
the right to be dismissed only after a fair procedure and for just
cause."1
84
The clarity and straightforwardness of this statutory formula would
benefit all. Employers would be able to gauge when they have exceeded
the bounds of the rights to discharge for just cause by referring to the
practice of the industry as developed in this area in collective bargaining
agreements.'8 " Similarly, employees might be able to better assess
whether or not they have a meritorious unjust discharge claim.
Employees who realize they do not have a substantial claim would
not process the grievance, thereby reducing the caseload of arbitrators
and reducing the burden and cost on the grievance system in general.
179. Id. at art. 6(2).
180. Convention, supra note 61, at art. 7.
181. Bellace, supra note 11, at 215.
182. Convention, supra note 61, at art. 8(1).
183. Bellace, supra note 11, at 238.
184. See Summers, supra note 160.
185. Id.
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State legislative drafters should, therefore, keep the language of the statu-
tory guarantee as simple and comprehensible as possible.
Another advantage of this approach is that it is congruent with the
standard already firmly established through collective bargaining in the
unionized sector of an employer's right to discharge "for just cause." In
applying the "just cause" standard, courts and arbitrators will be able to
refer to a body of law already developed by arbitrators on the meaning of
just cause.186
A third advantage to this form of statutory guarantee is that it could
be favorable to unions."18 Unions could champion the statute and thus
use advocacy of it as an organizing tool and political symbol.' More-
over, such a statute would also shift the burden of proof onto the em-
ployer to show just cause in cases involving dismissal of a union
sympathizer. '89
The fact that only one-fourth of American workers are protected
against unjust dismissal through collective bargaining agreements means
that the traditional bargaining processes have not produced protection
for the majority of workers. 1" Whatever the theoretical risks to the
traditional bargaining processes that may result from such a statute, they
do not outweigh the devastating costs to the approximately 100,000
workers a year who are fired without just cause.' 91
IV The French Model
As mentioned earlier, the French, as signatory to ILO Recommen-
dation No. 119, adopted the ILO standards relating to unjust cause.
192
Since the implementation of the ILO Recommendation in France, the
highest court of France, the Cour de Cassation, has undertaken the task
of shaping the contours of what is meant by "genuine and serious cause."
Often, this has resulted in a very restricted application of the unjust cause
standard. 93 That is, employers in France currently enjoy a judicial
trend favoring a narrow application of the concept of unjust cause.' 9 4 In
practice, an employer can still terminate an employee without a genuine
and serious cause for dismissal upon payment of damages. French critic
Rojot explains:
186. See St. Antoine, supra note 138, at 15.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Added to balance.
190. See Keyes, supra note 11, at 146 for an overview of federal law relating to termination of
employees for discriminatory motives.
191. St. Antoine, supra note 138, at 14.
192. See, supra note 74 (with the exception).
193. See, e.g., supra note 136.
194. Id.
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The principle remains that in France an individual contract of
employment of indeterminate duration is terminable at will by the em-
ployer, as well as by the employee, at any time, provided that the em-
ployer pays severance pay and gives the customary notice or makes
payments in lieu thereof.... This in practice means that an employer
willing to pay the price (severance pay, pay in lieu of notice, damages)
is always able to finally dismiss an employee if he wishes to do so.195
Notwithstanding the practical problems that the French model has de-
veloped, it does provide the United States with an initial point of depar-
ture. Much of the structure of the French model could be readily
transplanted to the United States.' 9 6
A. International Implications
International commentators have seen a general trend in the devel-
opment of unjust dismissal statutes. It has been observed that through-
out the industrial world, "[o]n balance... the equities [now] tilt toward
the individual employee."' 9 7 Unfortunately, this description overlooks
the United States. All other major industrialized democracies in the
world have provided protection for their workers through unjust dismis-
sal legislation.198
The United States is the only industrialized nation in the world to
persist in the practice of permitting employers to dismiss employees
wrongfully.' 99 The United States stands alone in its position of so vigor-
ously opposing and rejecting the Recommendation No. 119 and the sub-
sequent Convention No. 158 unfair dismissal standards.2 ° °  ILO
standards, as set forth in ILO recommendations and conventions, an-
nounce not the ideal or standard for best practice in a given area, but
rather set out the standard of minimally acceptable behavior. Hence, the
195. Rojot, supra note 83, at 50.
196. See Bellace, supra note 11, at 207. (Author explains how British law on unfair dismissal is
instructive to the U.S. and outlines how the U.S. could inexpensively implement the ILO standards,
using a model building on the current Pennsylvania unemployment claims system.)
197. St. Antoine, supra note 138, at 14.
198. Id., and accompanying text.
199. Of the member states voting at the June 1982 ILO Conference on the proposed Convention,
"Termination of Employment At The Initiative of the Employer", supra note 61, only seven coun-
tries had representatives who voted against adoption of the Convention. In six of the seven, only the
employers' representatives voted against the Convention. The United States was the only country
whose government representative voted against the Convention. (The United States employers' rep-
resentative also voted against the Convention). For the official record of the 1982 Convention, see
ILO, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE CONVENTION CONCERNING TERMINATION OF EM-
PLOYMENT AT THE INITIATIVE OF THE EMPLOYER, 68th Sess. ILO Convention, No. 158 (1982).
The ILO annually holds an International Labour Conference for the purpose of voting on conven-
tions, recommendations or resolutions. Conventions are ratified by a two-thirds vote. INTERNA-
TIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION CONST. art. 19(2). Each member state sends four voting delegates:
two representing the government, and one each representing employers and workers. Id., art. 3, I.
200. See supra note 61.
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United States' failure to adopt ILO standards sets the United States as
falling below the ILO's minimum standards.
Adoption of the ILO standards would directly undermine employ-
ment-at-will in the United States. In fact, this reason is exactly why the
United States' government and representatives opposed the 1982 Con-
vention on Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the Em-
ployer.2°' In order to address their concerns, it is important to
understand the reasons put forward by the United States' government
and employers' representatives for so vigorously opposing the Conven-
tion. First, as previously mentioned, the U.S. employers' representative
at the 1982 Conference opposed the ILO standards because of the limita-
tion on the employer's private initiative to dismiss workers for economic
or structural reasons.2 °2 The United States' government representative
specifically opposed the requirement of a just cause for termination and
post-dismissal appeal to an impartial arbitration committee where the
employer would be required to put forth a valid reason for the
termination.2 °3
Although the ILO does not have a mechanism by which it can en-
force its standards, the American government and industry opposition to
Convention No. 158 can be understood when it is noted that signatory
members seriously undertake the application of ILO standards to their
national systems.2°s In anticipation of this result, the United States
sought to contain, if not roll back, the impact which the approval of
Convention No. 158 would have on the standards for dismissal on Amer-
ican subsidiaries abroad. 20 5 For example, prior to the 1982 Conference,
the Council for International Business responded to the proposed Con-
vention by mounting a national lobbying effort against the ratification of
the Convention by informing its member companies with foreign subsidi-
201. Members are expected to implement through the appropriate national authority or instru-
ment the standards adopted at the convention within one year of the date of the convention's ratifica-
tion. Members assume an obligation to implement the convention's provisions by signing the ratified
convention and communicating such action to the Director-General of the ILO. Signatory members
periodically report to the International Labour Office as to actions taken through the national legis-
lature or other body to comply with the convention. But no enforcement mechanism exists to com-
pel signatory nations to comply. See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION CONST. art. 19(5).
202. The United States' representatives proposed in 1982 that the clause of the Convention re-
quiring the employer to state a valid reason for termination be removed from the Recommendation.
See Report, supra note 61. Spokesman for the United States, Paul Weinberg of American Express,
stated in the proceedings just before the vote that the United States opposed the Convention "basi-
cally because its very concept ... erodes the principle of termination at will." Id. no. 35 (Twenty-
Ninth Sitting), at 4 (June 22, 1982) quoted in Bellace, supra note I1, at 212-213 n.27.
203. See REPORT, supra note 61 (questionnaire to member countries relating to proposed
Convention).
204. See id., No. 356, at 4-5.
205. France's report outlining its compliance with the Recommendation was sent to the Interna-
tional Labor Office just before the enactment of the Law of 197.3. On the other hand, the United
States has ratified only seven ILO conventions. Bellace, supra note 11, at 217 n.53.
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aries of the contents of the Convention. 20 6 These United States' employ-
ers did not want to have to meet an unjust dismissal standard in business
operated overseas or domestically.2"' Nonetheless, compliance with the
ILO standard has not discouraged foreign investment in those countries
that have ratified the Convention. For instance, the United States con-
tinues to operate subsidiaries in France despite the fact that those plants
are subject to the French dismissal laws; and U.S. businesses have more
subsidiaries located in Great Britain than any other country notwith-
standing the fact that British law has adopted the whole of the ILO
standards.2 °8
Extending a minimum amount of protection against arbitrary and
capricious discharge to the vast majority of U.S. workers2°9 will not dis-
advantage U.S. employers in the international market because the United
States would be joining the vast majority of industrialized nations that
already have incorporated ILO unjust dismissal standards into their na-
tional legislation. Moreover, if the United States intends to remain com-
petitive in the international market, France, and other nations teach the
lesson that there may be a significant correlation between the security of




The United States is headed for a state-by-state legislative develop-
ment of an unjust dismissal statute that will look something like the
French statute in terms of its underlying purpose. These statutes will
give individual workers the right not to be terminated without some of
206. U.S. Council, Termination of Employment, INT'L LAB. AFF. REP., No. 3, at 5, 1982; see
The Employment-At- Will Issue, 111 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 23, at 9-12 (Nov. 22, 1982) (letter
from spokesman for United States at Convention Paul Weinberg of American Express to Chairman
of Council for International Business, urges coalition of efforts in order to block ratification of the
Convention because of the impact it would have on foreign subsidiaries). Quoted in Bellace, supra
note 11, at 217 n.54.
207. See supra note 202.
208. See Bellace, supra note 11, at 217.
209. THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL ISSUE-A BNA SPECIAL REPORT 24 Nov. 22, 1982 (provid-
ing useful statistics on the number of employees terminated annually under the employment-at-will
rule).
210. Approximately sixty countries in the world provide statutory protection against unjust dis-
charge. See Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Committee on Labor and Employment
Law, At-Will Employment and the Problem of Unjust Dismissal, 36 THE RECORD 170, 175 (1981)
(providing statistics on the status of dismissal legislation throughout the world) quoted in St. An-
toine supra note 138 at 3. For a comprehensive review of dismissal legislation in Europe, see COM-
MUNAUTE EUROPEENNt Du CHARBON ET DE L'ACIER HAUTE AUTORITI, LA STABILITt DE
L'EMPLOI DANS LE DROIT DES PAYS MEMBRES DE LA C.E.C.A. (1958). See St. Antoine, supra
note 138 at 18 comparing U.S. and Japan on same point; see also SPECIAL TASK FORCE, DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, WORK IN AMERICA 93-110, 188-201 (1972) (providing statis-
tics on productivity in U.S.).
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the procedural requirements (hearing, notice, and statement of motive
for termination) that the French statute currently requires. The state
courts will fill the gaps with respect to what is just cause in a fashion
similar to the work done by the Cour de Cassation in France. This devel-
opment is desirable because current federal legislation does not ade-
quately protect employees against an employer's arbitrary and capricious
dismissal. Dismissal legislation similar to that enacted in France is
workable in the United States and would bring the United States into the
community of industrialized nations of the world that already extend
such protection to their employees.
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